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Abstract 19 
Beginning in the 1990’s, Chile implemented an extensive Territorial User Rights for Fisheries 20 
(TURFs) network that now comprises nearly 1,000 TURFs. This network provides a rare 21 
opportunity to examine spatial and temporal trends in TURF use and impacts on surrounding open 22 
access areas (OAAs). In this analysis, landings of keyhole limpet (Fissurella spp.), kelp (Lessonia 23 
2 
 
spp.) and red sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) were used to estimate catch-per-unit effort (CPUEs) 24 
and catch-per-unit area (CPUAs) indices inside and outside TURFs by fishing cove. For these 25 
species, CPUEs and CPUAs in 2015 were significantly higher inside TURFs. However, temporal 26 
trends analyzed with a linear mixed effects model indicate that CPUAs inside TURFs have been 27 
significantly decreasing since 2000 for keyhole limpet, red sea urchin and for loco (Concholepas 28 
concholepas), while in OAAs this measure only decreased for limpet. An elastic net regression 29 
was used to better explain catches in OAAs during 2015, including a variety of variables related 30 
to the characteristics and activity of proximal TURFs. Results indicate that exogenous factors 31 
unrelated to TURF management were the primary drivers of catches in OAAs during 2015 but that 32 
factors related to proximal TURFs appear to have a slight negative impact that grows over time. 33 
Collectively, these results indicate that while TURFs are associated with higher catch rates than 34 
surrounding OAAs, catch rates appear to be decreasing over time and, though limited, the impact 35 
of TURFs on surrounding OAAs may be negative. These findings suggest a need for a more 36 
nuanced and dynamic approach to spatial management on benthic resources in Chile. 37 
 38 
Abbreviations 39 
CPUA: Catch per unit of area  40 
CPUE: Catch per unit of effort 41 
OAA: Open access area 42 
TURF: Territorial user right for fisheries 43 
 44 
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1. Introduction 45 
Spatial property rights can eliminate many common pool externalities that plague fisheries, 46 
thereby better incentivizing sustainable and profitable resource use (Beddington et al. 2007, 47 
Cancino 2007, Costello et al. 2008). Specifically, Territorial User Rights for Fisheries (TURFs) is 48 
a management tool that grants individuals or groups exclusive access to harvest resources within 49 
an area (Christy 1982). TURFs have been associated with biological, ecological and economic 50 
benefits in several small-scale fisheries (Castilla and Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2008a, 2012, 51 
Defeo et al. 2016). During the last decade, TURFs have been promoted as a general approach to 52 
tackling the negative impacts of open access fishing (Wilen et al. 2012, Kratz and Block 2013, 53 
FAO 2014, Nguyen Thi Quinh et al. 2017), particularly for unassessed fisheries in developing 54 
countries that often suffer from overexploitation (Costello et al. 2012). However, the full impacts 55 
of TURFs on fisheries sustainability, including long-term trends in catch rates and impacts beyond 56 
TURFs boundaries, are not yet fully understood (Orensanz et al. 2005, Aburto and Stotz 2013, 57 
Aburto et al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2019). As the implementation of individual quotas and marine 58 
protected areas has been found to have unintended impacts on unregulated subpopulations and 59 
habitats (referred to here as “management spillover”; Hilborn et al. 2004, Murawski et al. 2005, 60 
Asche et al. 2007, Branch 2009, Abbott and Haynie 2012), similar effects might be expected from 61 
other area- or rights-based management and conservation instruments, including TURFs. To our 62 
knowledge, the influence of the implementation of TURFs on surrounding areas has not yet been 63 
assessed (Nguyen Thi Quinh et al. 2017) despite the fact that the spatial dynamics of most fisheries 64 
exceed the scale of an individual TURF. This study looked at the long-term changes in catch and 65 
catch rates (i.e., catch per unit effort, CPUEs, and catch per unit area, CPUAs) inside and outside 66 
TURF managed areas and also evaluated the possibility of management spillover.  67 
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In Chile, the implementation of TURFs was a reaction to the collapse of the economically 68 
important artisanal fishery for the muricid snail Concholepas concholepas in the 1980s (known in 69 
Chile as loco, elsewhere as the false abalone) (Bernal et al. 1999). The fast recovery of the high 70 
valued loco stocks in initial TURFs increased demand for further TURF development along the 71 
entire Chilean coast throughout the 2000s. In 2017, there were 957 officially designated Chilean 72 
TURFs implemented as part of a national TURF policy (Fishery and Aquaculture Law n° 18, 73 
1991). According to the Chilean Fisheries Authorities, the primary objectives of Chilean TURFs 74 
are to “ensure the sustainability of artisanal fishing through the assignment of natural banks”, and 75 
to “maintain and increase the biological productivity of benthic resources” (SUBPESCA, 2003). 76 
This TURF network constitutes the dominant form of spatial management of benthic resources in 77 
Chile and is the largest worldwide, covering about 1,500 km2 (though only about half of these 957 78 
TURFs are currently operative). Known in Chile as “Área de Manejo y Explotaciones de Recursos 79 
Bentónicos” (Management Areas for the Exploitation of Benthic Resources; AMERB), this system 80 
grants exclusive fishing rights to legally constituted fishing organizations for the exploitation of 81 
benthic resources in defined portions of the seabed – usually adjacent to a caleta or artisanal fishing 82 
cove (Aburto et al. 2013). Each TURF has species-specific quotas proposed by the fishing 83 
organization and approved by the Undersecretary of Fisheries. Artisanal fisher organizations have 84 
to comply with a series of regulations, such as establishing a baseline study, management plan, 85 
and regular stock assessments, for which they have to contract technical assistance from 86 
specialized environmental and/or fisheries consultants (Gelcich et al. 2008b). TURFs are 87 
interspaced with open access areas (OAAs) where seasonal closures and limits on catch size are 88 
used, but entry, within-season effort, and total catch are not restricted. The Chilean TURFs system 89 
was initially (i.e., from the 1990s to the 2000s) successful and associated with positive ecological 90 
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and economic benefits, such as the recovery of loco stocks, increased species richness inside 91 
TURFs, and increased welfare and economic revenues (Castilla and Fernandez 1998, Defeo and 92 
Castilla 2005, Gelcich et al. 2008a, 2012). OAAs produced the majority of catch and fishing 93 
revenues however. While income from TURFs was largely supplemental, believed to represent 94 
7% to 41% of total incomes (Romero et al. 2016), it was thought to play an essential role in 95 
securing fishers’ livelihoods (Aburto et al. 2013, Van Holt 2012, Gelcich et al. 2017).  96 
Though ecological conditions appear to have improved within TURFs (Castilla and 97 
Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2012), TURF profitability is thought to have declined over the last 98 
decade (Gelcich et al. 2017). The development of abalone aquaculture in Asia has negatively 99 
influenced international demand for loco, leading to a reduction in exports from Chile to Asia 100 
(from 2,400 mt in 1993 to less than 1,000 mt in 2013), and a drop in the price of loco (Chávez et 101 
al. 2010, Castilla et al. 2016). Furthermore, the cost of TURF maintenance, which includes 102 
assessment, enforcement, and surveillance, is thought to have increased (based on perception 103 
surveys; Gelcich et al. 2009, 2017). Assessments are typically conducted by private environmental 104 
consultants, whose fees have increased in part because of the relatively small number of such 105 
companies available in Chile (Gelcich et al. 2009, Davis et al. 2015). Additionally, extensive 106 
illegal fishing (González et al. 2006, Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017, Oyanedel et al. 2017) suggests 107 
that local fishing organizations must dedicate significant time and resources to enforcement in 108 
TURFs. Though the Chilean government recognizes that there is poaching activity and, in theory, 109 
is responsible for apprehending and penalizing poachers, in practice the responsibility of detecting 110 
poaching in TURFs often falls on fishing organizations. Many fishers now indicate they do not 111 
have enough capacity (i.e. resources and time) for surveillance of their TURFs and consider 112 
“government punishment of poachers to be ineffective” (Moreno and Revenga 2014, Davis et al. 113 
6 
 
2015, Biggs et al. 2016). Thus, the combined influence of a lower price for loco and presumed 114 
increased maintenance costs, with a reduced enforcement capacity, have likely increased 115 
variability in financial returns and decreased the profitability of TURFs (Chávez et al. 2010, 116 
Gelcich et al. 2010, 2017). In fact, in recent years (roughly 2010-2017), fishers appear to be relying 117 
on TURFs less than initially (i.e., 1990s-2000s) and TURF exploitation now represents a smaller 118 
fraction of fishers’ overall incomes (Gelcich et al. 2017). This has coincided with an observed 119 
increase in exploitation of OAAs (de Juan et al. 2017) and substantial illegal fishing of locos 120 
(Andreu-Cazenave et al. 2017). Reduced incentives for the exploitation of a TURF could either 121 
result in its abandonment (San Martín et al. 2010, Gelcich et al. 2017), its maintenance for purposes 122 
other than fishing such as market access or social empowerment (Cancino et al. 2007, Zúñiga et 123 
al. 2010, Aburto et al. 2013, Rosas et al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2017), or its maintenance at a lower 124 
but still positive level of profitability. 125 
Potential positive or negative interactions between maintained TURFs and surrounding 126 
OAAs are unknown. The large TURF system of Chile offers opportunities to explore the 127 
consequences of spatial management on fisheries in surrounding areas. TURFs are expected to 128 
secure fisheries harvests within their boundaries and provide incentives for sustainable use of 129 
surrounding fishing grounds (Christy 1982). Recent studies in the Chilean system of TURFs have 130 
shown higher potential egg production of two benthic species (the limpet Fissurella latimarginata 131 
and the red sea urchin Loxechinus albus) within TURFs than under an open access scenario (67% 132 
and 52% higher, respectively) (Blanco et al. 2017, Fernández et al. 2017), suggesting the potential 133 
to enhance fishing opportunities both inside and outside TURFs. Negative impacts of TURFs and 134 
other entry-restriction management and conservation tools beyond their limits are less well known. 135 
Management spillover consisting of effort displacement from high-regulation TURFs to lower-136 
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regulation areas outside TURFs (analogous to the “fisheries squeeze effect” in the context of 137 
marine protected areas; Attwood and Bennett 1995, Bohnsack 2000, Halpern et al. 2004) could be 138 
expected to occur, potentially deteriorating opportunities in surrounding fishing grounds. Recent 139 
reductions in TURF profitability may provide increased incentives for TURF users to increase 140 
fishing effort in OAAs, possibly further eroding the sustainability and profitability of Chilean 141 
coastal fisheries in these areas. 142 
The primary goals of this study were to analyze catch and catch rates within and outside of 143 
TURFs to document any trends and interactions that might impact the ability of the TURF system 144 
to meet the objectives of ensuring sustainability and increasing biological productivity of benthic 145 
fishery resources. Specifically, we first examined and compared CPUE and CPUA indices (catch 146 
rates) between TURFs and adjacent OAAs by fishing cove in 2015 for three important target 147 
species (keyhole limpet (Fissurella spp.), kelp (Lessonia spp.) and red sea urchin (Loxechinus 148 
albus)). Second, temporal dynamics in TURF and OAA catch rates were investigated by looking 149 
at time series of CPUAs calculated for each management area by fishing cove and year. Finally, 150 
to assess if catch rate differences between TURFs and adjacent OAAs observed in 2015 were 151 
related to TURF implementation, a penalized regression model was developed to explain catch in 152 
OAAs. The explanatory variables examined in the model were either related to proximal TURFs’ 153 
characteristics and activity (e.g., TURF age, TURF area fraction, TURF fishing effort), or 154 
additional geospatial variables related to the spatial extent and context of OAAs (e.g., coastline 155 
length, local productivity, proximity to urban areas). 156 
 157 
2. Methods 158 
2.1 Data 159 
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National data on catch and effort by fishing cove were obtained from the governmental 160 
agency SERNAPESCA (National Fisheries Service). Artisanal fishers are required to report 161 
landings by species, weight and origin (i.e., TURF or OAA; Moreno and Revenga 2014). TURF 162 
geographical layers were obtained from the governmental agency SUBPESCA (Undersecretary of 163 
fisheries). Fishing coves considered for the study (Fig. 1) had at least one designated TURF 164 
assigned to a fishers’ organization (referred to here as a functioning TURF; i.e., an operative TURF 165 
with a use agreement and quota in place or a stand-by TURF for which a quota has been assigned 166 
in the last 4 years, but monitoring has not been conducted by the due date, Appendix 1). 167 
The artisanal benthic fisheries of Chile target a variety of species, including crustaceans, 168 
mollusks, sea urchins, tunicates and several species of seaweed (Gelcich et al. 2010). Catch data 169 
were obtained from landings reports, focusing on the most important benthic resources targeted in 170 
TURFs. The primary target resource inside TURFs is the loco, which has the highest commercial 171 
value (beach sale value: 11,647 US$/mt; landings: 2,255 mt in 2011) (Moreno and Revenga 2014). 172 
Loco extraction is banned in OAAs, and, therefore, only catches from inside TURFs were analyzed 173 
for this species. Kelps (comprising the Lessonia nigrescens species complex, Lessonia 174 
trabeculata, Macrocystis pyrifera and Macrocystis integrifolia) and the red sea urchin (Loxechinus 175 
albus) are the largest landed benthic resources ranked by weight (landings: ~300,000 mt and 176 
31,901 mt for kelp and sea urchin, respectively, in 2011). We also considered catches of keyhole 177 
limpets (comprising Fissurella spp., Fissurella costata, Fissurella cumingi, Fissurella 178 
latimarginata, Fissurella picta, and Fissurella maxima), another economically important benthic 179 
resource (beach sale value: 2,354 US$/mt; landings: 1,785 mt in 2011). Individual catch reports 180 
from 2000 through 2015 for these four main exploited benthic resources were aggregated by 181 
fishing cove and month (an individual harvester could report catch several times in a month), and 182 
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distinguished by their origin (i.e., inside or outside TURFs). Catches in OAAs (i.e., outside 183 
TURFs) included catches gathered from artisanal boats or from the shore.  184 
The number of active harvesters in 2016 per fishing cove was also obtained from 185 
SERNAPESCA (most recent estimation, note that the number of fishers for 2015 was not 186 
available). Individuals who have not operated for the last three successive years were removed 187 
from the national registry. Chilean law distinguishes four categories of artisanal harvesters: 1) 188 
Divers, who manually extract mollusks, crustaceans or echinoderms, or spearfish for reef fish, 189 
usually operating from a boat; 2) Collectors, who harvest or collect seaweeds from the shore; 3) 190 
Fishers, who are captains or crew members of an artisanal boat, from which they operate with nets, 191 
including trammel nets, long lines, and hand lines; and 4) Ship owners, who are limited to one or 192 
two artisanal boats, defined as 18 meters or less in length, and 50 tons or less. The different 193 
categories are not mutually exclusive. Effort was estimated in terms of the number of divers (for 194 
loco, limpet and sea urchin exploitation) or number of collectors (for kelp exploitation) registered 195 
in a fishing cove and able to exploit the resource. Fishers’ organizations that are granted a TURF 196 
can only be comprised of licensed artisanal harvesters. However, not all licensed artisanal 197 
harvesters are part of a fishers’ organization. Therefore, effort “inside” TURFs only considered 198 
licensed harvesters who were also registered in the corresponding fishers’ organization, while 199 
effort “outside” TURFs considered all licensed harvesters registered in a particular fishing cove. 200 
A small number of harvesters (about 10%) were licensed in one fishing cove but associated with 201 
fishing organizations in different fishing coves. To avoid overestimating effort per fishing cove, 202 
the contribution of an individual harvester to effort in a cove was calculated by equally dividing 203 
one unit of effort (i.e., one harvester) among the different fishing coves with which the harvester 204 
was associated. 205 
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Fishing area estimates, for both TURFs and OAAs in each cove, were calculated using 206 
different data and proxies. TURF areas were obtained through a Google Earth layer publicly 207 
available on the SUBPESCA website for 2016. Total fishing ground polygons (comprising TURFs 208 
and OAAs) were created per fishing cove based on sailing time and bathymetry (Appendix 2). 209 
Buffer zones of 17 km (alongshore cutoff) around fishing coves were produced in ArcGIS to 210 
represent total accessible fishing grounds for each cove. The 17-km cutoff was based on the 211 
average distance from the fishing cove center to fishing grounds potentially visited as determined 212 
by artisanal fisher survey results (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). These 17-km buffers were then 213 
intersected with a bathymetric polygon consisting of the area between 0 and 20 m depth. The 214 
offshore width of these polygons was based on a typical maximum harvest depth of 20 m 215 
(González et al. 2006). These alongshore and offshore cutoffs are similar to those used by Castilla 216 
(1994) and Aburto et al. (2009) which applied an offshore limit of 30 m and an alongshore cutoff 217 
of 15 km based on travel distance with one full tank of gas. The 20-m isopleth was only available 218 
for central Chile (from 27° to 36°, Fig. 1) whereas a 100-m isopleth was available for the whole 219 
Chilean coast (source GEBCO). Estimates for the areas of the 0-20 m fishing ground depth range 220 
were derived from the areas of 0-100 m depth range using multiple linear regression (see Appendix 221 
2 for details). Finally, estimates of OAA areas were calculated as total area of fishing grounds 222 
minus assigned TURFs areas. 223 
 224 
2.2 Catch rate comparisons between TURFs and OAAs in 2015 225 
Annual catches divided by the number of active months (several species are only landed 226 
during part of the year) of keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin were used to estimate CPUEs 227 
and CPUAs per fishing cove for 2015 (most recent complete year for catch data at the time of the 228 
11 
 
study, SERNAPESCA). Loco’s estimates were not compared since its extraction is banned in 229 
OAAs, and, therefore, only catches from inside TURFs were available. CPUEs and CPUAs were 230 
differentiated by their origin, i.e., catches inside TURFs or in OAAs, and then compared to one 231 
another to determine differences in fisheries productivity. CPUEs for each fishing cove were 232 
calculated as the catches inside or outside TURFs divided by the adjusted number of divers (or 233 
collectors) (i.e., after having adjusted this number to account for harvesters associated with 234 
multiple fishing coves) inside or outside TURFs, respectively. The number of licensed harvesters 235 
in 2016 was the best available effort proxy for estimating CPUEs in 2015 even though this is a 236 
crude estimate as it is unknown how many trips each individual took. CPUAs for each fishing cove 237 
were calculated as the catches inside or outside TURFs divided by the total assigned TURF area 238 
(inside) or the estimated OAA area (outside). For each group of species, differences between 239 
CPUEs and CPUAs inside and outside TURFs were tested for statistical significance using a 240 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Reporting rates from TURFs and OAAs could differ 241 
given higher enforcement capacity within TURFs (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). We therefore 242 
calculated what catch in OAAs would have to be for catch rates in OAAs to equal those in TURFs 243 
(assuming full reporting in TURFs), and then deduced the misreporting rate in OAAs it would 244 
imply for each species and catch rate metric. 245 
 246 
2. 3 Temporal analyses of CPUAs inside and outside TURFs 247 
CPUAs of loco, keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin were analyzed over time to 248 
investigate temporal performance of TURFs and OAAs over the last two decades. Fisheries data 249 
was only available at the scale of an entire fishing cove, prohibiting differentiation between 250 
multiple TURFs associated with a single fishing cove. Estimated OAA areas from 2016 were 251 
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adjusted over years according to implemented TURFs’ area for that year and fishing cove 252 
(implementation year of TURFs were available from the SUBPESCA data). Complementary 253 
temporal analysis of CPUE trends was not feasible as the annual number of fishers was not 254 
available at the fishing cove scale. Changes in CPUA over time may reflect changes in biomass, 255 
changes in fishing effort, or changes in spatial management. If biomass were improving inside 256 
TURFs, CPUAs in these areas might be expected to increase over time. Conversely, if TURFs 257 
displaced fishing effort into OAAs, CPUAs in OAAs might be expected to decrease due to 258 
overfishing (but may increase initially as increased effort fishes down stocks). Additionally, a 259 
fishing cove can have several TURFs (up to 15 managed areas, but on average three). If the initial 260 
TURF implemented in a given fishing cove was located in the best habitat (Wilen et al. 2012), then 261 
fishing coves with multiple TURFs might experience sequential reductions in CPUAs. Finally, as 262 
catch depends on effort, it is also possible that changes in CPUA reflect changes in fishing effort 263 
over time (e.g., CPUA reductions arising due to reduced fishing effort independent of any changes 264 
in fish stocks). 265 
A linear mixed effects model (i.e., model 1) was used to estimate the temporal trend and 266 
the effect of the number of TURFs per fishing cove on CPUAs inside and outside TURFs: 267 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎� = 𝛽𝛽1𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎 (1) 
In (1), the dependent variable is the log-transformed CPUA for species s, observed in the fishing 268 
cove i, for year t, in area a (inside or outside TURFs). 𝛽𝛽1,𝛽𝛽2 are the unknown coefficients of the 269 
fixed effects variables year (from 2000 to 2015) and NTURF, the number of functioning (i.e., 270 
operative or stand by) TURFs per fishing cove for each year, respectively. 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 is a random effect 271 
for fishing cove i, to control for heterogeneity across fishing coves and 𝜀𝜀𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,𝑎𝑎 is the error term.  272 
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To further disentangle the effects of time and number of TURFs per fishing cove on 273 
CPUAs, an additional linear mixed effects model (i.e., model 2) was developed without the 274 
variable NTURF. Model 2 included a subsample of 57 fishing coves (29% of the 196 coves 275 
considered in this study) that have had a constant number of TURF(s) for at least 10 years.  276 
Statistical estimation of coefficients was performed in R (R Core Team, 2018) with the 277 
lme4 package (Bates et al. 2015). Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination, r2m and 278 
r2c, respectively, were estimated with the MuMIn package (Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013). 279 
 280 
2. 4 Elastic net regression model 281 
The catches of keyhole limpet, kelp and red sea urchin from OAAs in 2015 were examined 282 
to assess the impact of adjacent TURF characteristics and activity. Chile is divided into 15 283 
administrative regions; fisheries for each of the species groups considered in this analysis generally 284 
occur in only a subset of these regions (Appendix 3). As the great majority of limpet and kelp catch 285 
occurred in the northern regions of Chile (specifically regions II, III, IV and V) and the great 286 
majority of sea urchin catch occurred in the southern region (specifically, regions VIII, IX, XIV, 287 
X and XI), data for species-specific analyses were limited to these northern and southern zones 288 
(see Section 3.1 for details regarding the basis for selecting these zones). 289 
A regularized linear regression model, the elastic net regression (Zou and Hastie 2005, see 290 
Appendix 4 for model development), was developed to explain catch per cove in OAAs, including 291 
explanatory variables either related to proximal TURFs’ characteristics and activity, or related to 292 
geospatial context (e.g., area and coastline length) and number of fishers targeting a given species. 293 
This model uses a penalized maximum likelihood method that allows a large number of variables 294 
to be included with relatively few observations and prevents over-fitting issues prevalent in more 295 
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common Ordinary Least Square (OLS) or stepwise regression methods (Friedman et al. 2010, 296 
Morozova et al. 2015). The algorithm accomplishes variable selection by constraining the sum of 297 
the magnitudes of normalized coefficients. A shrinkage penalty is included in the objective 298 
function; it “shrinks” the effect of unimportant variables to select the simplest and most accurate 299 
model. Two different values of the regularization parameter controlling the strength of the 300 
shrinkage were considered; only results from the less restrictive regularization are shown here (see 301 
Appendix 5 for results with the more restrictive regularization, i.e., a larger penalty that leads to 302 
models with a smaller number of predictors with non-zero coefficients). 303 
The response variables, i.e., catches in OAAs for limpet, kelp, and sea urchin, were log-304 
transformed before centering. We considered catch as the dependent variable instead of CPUEs 305 
and CPUAs because we preferred a model including both effort and area as explanatory variables 306 
simultaneously. 307 
Given that effort displacement and any resulting ecological and social impacts are dynamic 308 
processes, TURFs established for longer periods might be expected to have more significant 309 
effects on catches outside of TURFs. In order to assess these temporal effects, elastic net models 310 
included the variables number of years since the implementation of a TURF (Age_TURF) and 311 
number of years since the establishment of the associated fishers’ organization 312 
(Age_Organization) (source SUBPESCA). In theory, a fisher’s organization is established before 313 
a TURF is implemented, but in some instances (~30% of our fishing coves), the organization had 314 
changed over time or several TURFs had merged or been split leading to the TURF being 315 
implemented before the associated fishers’ organization. Since several fishers’ organizations can 316 
operate in each cove and a fishing cove can have several TURFs, each associated with one fisher’s 317 
organization, the average and maximum values were calculated for both Age_TURF and 318 
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Age_Organization. Spatial aspects of TURF use were captured by the variables N_TURF, 319 
Area_Fraction and Area_OA which measured the number of functioning TURFs per fishing cove, 320 
the fraction of the total estimated fishing ground managed as TURFs and the total area of open 321 
access grounds, respectively. The potential effects of fishing effort displacement should be greater 322 
in fishing grounds with more TURFs and/or proportionately larger TURFs or smaller OAAs. 323 
Fishing effort was included through the variables Harvesters_All, Harvesters_per_OAA and 324 
Harvesters_per_TURFs, respectively, the total number of divers (or collectors) in OAAs, the 325 
number of divers (or collectors) in OAAs divided by the OAAs area, and the number of divers (or 326 
collectors) inside TURFs divided by the TURFs area. The predictions are that catch in OAAs 327 
should increase with the total number of divers (or collectors) and decrease with the number of 328 
divers (or collectors) per unit of area. Finally, the number of fisher’s organizations per fishing 329 
cove, N_ORG, was used as another proxy for local effort levels and fisheries involvement. 330 
Data on additional geospatial variables related to the spatial extent and context of OAAs 331 
were also obtained to include in analyses of catch for each species. Coastline length was calculated 332 
for fishing grounds adjacent to a fishing cove to capture differences in coastal habitats (e.g., 333 
straight along beach and sinuous along cove leading to short and long coastline lengths, 334 
respectively). Fractured coastlines with many small inlets are expected to be more favorable for 335 
sea urchin productivity (Lawrence 2006) whereas linear beaches may represent regions of wide 336 
continental shelf where unproductive sandy habitat is more common. As proximity to urban areas 337 
might impact exploitation rates and other human pressures on benthic resources, a binary variable 338 
was included to indicate if a fishing cove was within 50 km of one of the ten biggest cities of Chile 339 
(source Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas). We also identified fishing coves close to fishing ports, 340 
since increased market access could trigger higher effort and catches. Thus, if a fishing cove was 341 
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within 50 km of one of the forty major fishing ports of Chile, total landings by weight (comprising 342 
algae, fish, mollusk, crustacean, other) from these proximal fishing ports were summed together 343 
and associated with this cove; if no fishing ports were within 50 km, this variable was set to zero. 344 
Finally, CPUEs for each species group (i.e., loco, keyhole limpet, kelp and sea urchin) within 345 
TURFs were included as proxies for local abundance conditions. Abbreviations, definitions and 346 
units for all variables included in the elastic net regression are given in Table 1. 347 
Model parameters were estimated with the glmnet algorithm in R (Friedman et al. 2010, R 348 
Development Core Team 2018). A bootstrapping process, randomly sampling the data with 349 
replacement, was used to re-estimate the model 10,000 times. Coefficient means (?̅?𝛽), standard 350 
errors (𝜎𝜎𝛽𝛽) and probabilities of inclusion for each regression coefficient were calculated following 351 
bootstrap iterations. We considered “highly important” predictors to be those with coefficients 352 
retained in at least 80% of the bootstrap iterations; “important” predictors to be coefficients 353 
retained in 60 to 80 % of the iterations; and “moderately important” to be coefficients retained in 354 
40 to 60% of the iterations. Elastic net log-linear regression coefficients were transformed into 355 
percent changes in catch for a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula: 356 
%∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽.∆𝑥𝑥 − 1�.  357 
OLS models using either the full set of independent variables (OLS_all), using only TURF 358 
related variables (OLS_TURF), using only geospatial context variables (OLS_Geo) or using only 359 
variables selected by the elastic net model (OLS_elastic) were also run for comparison with the 360 
elastic net outputs. P-values for the coefficients of each explanatory factor in the OLS models were 361 
adjusted utilizing the Dunn-Šidák correction method for multiple statistical tests (Šidák 1967, Ury 362 
1976). We considered the possibility of spatial heterogeneity in catch reporting by examining OLS 363 
model residuals using Studentized Breusch-Pagan tests. 364 
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 365 
3. Results 366 
3.1 Regional description of the system 367 
We analyzed 196 fishing coves with a total of 478 functioning TURFs in this study. 368 
Average TURF size was 1.5 km2 (ranging from 0.01 km2 to 39 km2). Average total TURF area per 369 
fishing cove was 4 (±7.3) km2 while average OAA area per fishing cove was 82 (±29) km2. Limpet 370 
and kelp catch in the northern regions (i.e., regions II, III, IV, V) accounted for 81.3% and 84.8% 371 
of total national catch of each species group, respectively. Contrarily, 95.1% of sea urchin catch 372 
and 77.6% of loco catch were landed in the southern regions (i.e., regions VIII, IX, XIV, X and 373 
XI, Fig. 1, Appendix 3). The contrasting landing patterns were accompanied by differences in 374 
TURFs’ size. TURF average area per fishing cove was higher and more variable in southern 375 
regions (4.9 ± 9.3 km2) than in the northern region (3.2 ± 3.1 km2), and OAA average sizes 376 
associated with each fishing cove were larger in southern regions (90.5 ±29.2 km2) than in northern 377 
regions (58.0 ±103.0 km2) (Table 2). The sizes of OAAs were consistently larger than those of 378 
TURFs, however the ratio between OAA and TURF size was similar between the north and the 379 
south. In terms of effort, the number of divers (or collectors) that could fish in OAAs was higher 380 
than the number that could fish in TURFs, with this difference being larger for fishing coves in the 381 
south (Table 2). 382 
 383 
3.2 Catch rate comparisons between TURFs and OAAs 384 
CPUE and CPUA values for 2015 for each fishing cove were compared by their origin, i.e. 385 
inside or outside TURFs (Fig. 2). CPUEs for limpet were observed to be higher inside TURFs 386 
(p=0.01). However, CPUEs were not significantly different between the two origins for kelp 387 
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(p=0.36) and sea urchin extraction (p=0.34), though their corresponding medians were higher 388 
inside TURFs. For each of the three groups of species, CPUAs were significantly higher inside 389 
TURFs (p=2.1 x 10-5 for limpet, p=5.4 x 10-6 for kelp, and p=1 x 10-3 for sea urchin). Overall, 390 
median catch rates were at least 75% higher inside TURFs (Table 3). With regard to catch rate 391 
values across species, limpet and red sea urchin were caught at similar rates in terms of metric 392 
tonnes per month per unit effort/area, whereas kelp was caught at a much higher rate, and loco was 393 
caught at an intermediate rate. Assuming perfect reporting within TURFs, equal catch rates 394 
between TURFs and OAAs imply 70% to 99% of catch from OAAs would be unreported. Higher 395 
catch rates observed in TURFs therefore appear to be robust to catch misreporting 396 
 397 
3.3 Temporal mixed effects analysis of area catch rates 398 
 Linear mixed effects models revealed that CPUAs had decreased significantly over time 399 
inside TURFs, with rates of decrease of 7.8%, 4%, and 4.8% per year for loco, limpet, and sea 400 
urchin, respectively (p < 0.05, Table 4). For all species groups, CPUAs also significantly decreased 401 
inside TURFs as the number of TURFs implemented in a fishing cove increased (between 10 and 402 
29% decrease in CPUA per additional TURF implemented, p<0.05, Table 4). Effects of the 403 
temporal driver Year were weaker in OAAs (Table 5). Only CPUAs for limpet significantly 404 
decreased in OAAs over years (4.7% decrease in CPUA/year, p<0.05, Table 5). Interestingly, 405 
CPUAs for kelp increased significantly outside of TURFs over time (3% increase per year, p=0.02, 406 
Table 5) whereas there was no temporal trend inside TURFs. The number of TURFs did not have 407 
any effect on CPUAs in OAAs for any of the species groups considered. Predicted values of 408 
CPUAs inside TURFs from 2000 and 2015 were consistently higher than predicted values of 409 
CPUAs within OAAs (Figure 3). When the models were restricted to just the subset of fishing 410 
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coves having a constant number of TURFs (i.e., model 2), CPUAs were found to decrease 411 
significantly over time inside TURFs for loco (8.5% decrease per year), and outside TURFs for 412 
limpet (2.5% decrease per year, p<0.05, Tables 4 and 5). Differences between conditional r2c and 413 
marginal r2m show that 40% to 80% of variability is due to spatial heterogeneity across fishing 414 
coves (Tables 4 and 5). 415 
 416 
3.4 Elastic net regression of OAA catch  417 
3.4.1 OLS and elastic net regressions comparison 418 
Catch of limpet, kelp, and sea urchin in OAAs were examined to resolve the effect of 419 
TURFs on adjacent areas in 2015 (loco is not included in OLS and elastic net regressions since its 420 
extraction is banned in OAAs). OLS models were inconclusive, yielding no significant predictors 421 
of catches outside TURFs though a considerable proportion of the variances were explained 422 
(adjusted r2 = 0.31 for limpet, 0.55 for kelp, and 0.34 for sea urchin, Table 6). Geospatial variables 423 
were found to explain a greater amount of variance than TURF variables in OLS models for all 424 
species. Elastic net regression models explained similar proportions of variance as the OLS 425 
models, but with fewer variables (adjusted r2 =0.31 for limpet, 0.55 for kelp, and 0.51 for sea 426 
urchin, Table 6).  427 
 428 
3.4.2 Predictors selected by the elastic net regression of OAA catch 429 
Contrasting results from the elastic net regression model were found for the three groups 430 
of species, with different predictors selected by the penalized model in explaining OAA catches 431 
(Table 7). All “highly important predictors” retained to explain catch in OAAs for the three species 432 
groups were related to the geospatial context. The predictor Urban_Area was selected in 83.69% 433 
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of the 10,000 bootstraps when modeling limpet catches and 99.73% of the bootstraps when 434 
modeling kelp extraction, being the strongest identified driver of catch outside of TURFs in both 435 
cases. This predictor exhibited a negative relationship with catches outside TURFs for both species 436 
groups, with lower catches in the OAAs for limpet (33% decrease for coves within 50 km to urban 437 
areas compared to those far from urban areas) and kelp (72% decrease) in fishing coves close to 438 
urban areas. Additional predictors for catch of limpet outside TURFs included Area_OAA2 439 
(selected in 60.35% of cases) and Area_fraction (selected in 41.86% of the bootstraps; definitions 440 
of predictors in Table 1). There was a 0.08% reduction in limpet catch per 10 km2 of additional 441 
OAA area and a 1.5% reduction per 1% increase in the fraction of the total area that is TURF.  442 
Several variables were found to be important predictors of kelp catches in OAAs. Loco 443 
CPUEs inside TURF (Loco_per_diver) was a highly important, positive predictor of outside 444 
catches of kelp and was included in 91.11% of the bootstraps (42% increase of kelp catch in OAAs 445 
for every additional 1 mt catch of loco per diver within the TURF, with the average loco catch 446 
being 0.46 mt loco/diver). Similarly, higher catch rates of kelp inside TURFs were associated with 447 
higher catches of kelp outside (1.4% increase of kelp catch outside a TURF for every additional 1 448 
mt catch of kelp per collector within the TURF, with the average kelp catch being 8.6 mt 449 
kelp/collector). Counterintuitively, lower catches of kelp outside of TURFs were associated with 450 
fishing coves that had larger OAAs (11% decrease in catch for every additional 10 km2 of OAA 451 
area; Area_OAA and Area_OAA2 were selected in at least 80% of bootstraps). Lower catches of 452 
kelp outside of TURFs were associated with fishing coves that had older TURFs (e.g., for every 453 
year increase in Age_TURF_max, there is a ~8% decrease in catch; Age_TURF_mean and 454 
Age_TURF_max were included in 73.03% and 84.40% of the bootstraps) and fishing coves with a 455 
higher fraction of fishing grounds managed as TURFs (0.8% decrease for every 1% increase in the 456 
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fraction of area designated as TURFs; Area_fraction was selected in 47.36% of models). Finally, 457 
lower catches of kelp in OAAs were observed in fishing coves with several fishers’ organizations 458 
(4.4% decrease for every additional organization). The model indicates that OAAs with higher 459 
catches of kelp tended to be smaller, outside of urban centers, in areas with productive loco 460 
fisheries, and have fewer, younger, and proportionately smaller proximate TURFs. 461 
Higher catches of sea urchin in OAAs were associated with fishing coves that have longer 462 
coastline lengths (13% increase in catch for every additional 10 km of coastline). This predictor 463 
was highly important in explaining catch of sea urchin (selected in 98.98% of cases). A decrease 464 
of sea urchin catch in OAAs was observed in fishing coves that had older TURFs (3% decrease in 465 
catch for every additional year since TURF implementation). The related variables 466 
Age_TURF_max and Age_TURF_mean were included in 47.3% and 47.0% of the bootstraps, 467 
respectively. 468 
 469 
4. Discussion 470 
We evaluated temporal and spatial trends in catch and catch rates for TURFs and OAAs in 471 
Chile. This study is the first to consider fishing coves all along the Chilean coast to understand the 472 
TURF system in its entirety (TURFs and their surrounding areas) over two decades. Though 473 
increased CPUEs inside of TURFs compared to OAAs has been demonstrated in previous 474 
literature (Castilla and Fernández 1998, Gelcich et al. 2012, Defeo et al. 2016), most studies have 475 
focused on small-scale projects in specific regions of the country. The most spatially extensive 476 
study was based on a systematic literature review of the effects of TURFs on ecosystem services 477 
in Chile considering 268 study sites all along the Chilean coast (Gelcich et al. 2019). It showed 478 
that TURFs sustain biodiversity and all typologies of ecosystem services (i.e., supporting, 479 
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provisioning, regulating and cultural services), but stressed a lack of studies addressing potential 480 
negative or unpredicted consequences of TURFs and a need to better understand changes over time 481 
(Gelcich et al. 2019). Our study expands the scale of previous analyses, focusing on the comparison 482 
between TURFs and OAAs, and shows that median catch rates (CPUAs and CPUEs) of benthic 483 
resources were at least 75% higher inside TURFs than in surrounding areas. To the extent that 484 
these catch rates are indicators of biomass, this result points out that Chilean TURFs appear to 485 
align with their main objectives in 2015, i.e. “ensure the sustainability of artisanal fishing through 486 
the assignment of natural banks” and “maintain and increase the biological productivity of benthic 487 
resources”. However, our study also indicates that catch rates have been steadily declining within 488 
TURFs and that TURFs may impact catch levels in surrounding OAAs, both of which are potential 489 
risks to system sustainability.  490 
Three possible mechanisms could produce higher CPUASs and CPUEs in TURFs: 1) 491 
recovered biomass could have built up and improved catch rates within TURFs over time, 2) 492 
TURFs could have been implemented in areas of better habitat and higher quality grounds, and/or 493 
3) effort displacement following the implementation of TURFs could have degraded OAAs over 494 
time. CPUAs and CPUEs of loco, keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin in TURFs and OAAs 495 
were analyzed to investigate differences between areas and over time. Additionally, catch of 496 
keyhole limpet, kelp, and red sea urchin in OAAs was investigated to resolve any impacts of 497 
proximal TURFs. Our findings indicate that CPUAs and CPUEs are consistently larger inside 498 
TURFs but that CPUAs have been decreasing in TURFs over time and also with the number of 499 
TURFs implemented by fishing cove. Further, a weak negative impact of proximal TURFs on 500 
catches in OAAs was also found. This evidence appears to provide the strongest support for the 501 
hypothesis that TURFs were selectively implemented in the best fishing grounds since catch rates 502 
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are higher inside TURFs throughout our data, yet declining over time and with the addition of new 503 
TURFs. Additionally, the small negative effect of proximal TURFs of OAA catches could result 504 
from effort displacement and suggests management spillover. Declining catch rates over time 505 
within TURFs does not appear to support the hypothesis that catch rates are improved in TURFs 506 
due to a recovery of biomass. As we were only able to calculate CPUAs over time, this finding 507 
could result from consistent reductions in effort. Nationally, however, the number of registered 508 
divers has been constant while the number of collectors has increased over the last decade 509 
(Appendix 6, Sernapesca 2015). It is not clear how average fishing effort by registered harvesters 510 
(e.g., number of trips/harvester) may have changed over this period, and TURFs may now be used 511 
less intensively. Interestingly, for some species, CPUAs were found to have been decreasing in 512 
fishing coves that have had a constant number of TURF(s) for at least 10 years, indicating that the 513 
observed temporal change in CPUA is not only due to selective implementation of TURFs, but 514 
possibly due to changes in the local environment or the intensity of fishing effort.  515 
Exogenous geospatial factors (e.g., coastline, OAA areas, urban areas) were the main 516 
drivers explaining variability of catches in OAAs across fishing coves for 2015 (based on selection 517 
in elastic net regressions and the greater amount of variance explained in the OLS analyses 518 
including just these variables, Table 5). Geospatial predictors always had a higher percentage of 519 
inclusion when compared to TURF management-related predictors (Table 6). The negative 520 
relationship between catches of limpet and kelp in OAAs and proximity to urban centers could be 521 
due to higher historical fishing pressure and deteriorated environments in more populated urban 522 
areas. Additionally, catch of kelp, a lower value product, in OAAs could also be higher in rural 523 
areas where there are fewer economic opportunities and thus lower opportunity costs for fishers. 524 
Fishing coves with longer coastline lengths seem to support higher catches of sea urchin, 525 
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suggesting environmental factors related to coastline complexity may be the principal drivers for 526 
sea urchin abundance and availability. The effect of TURFs on catches in OAAs was especially 527 
weak for limpet and sea urchin (TURF-related predictors selected for 40 to 50% of bootstraps). 528 
However, when predictors related to TURFs’ characteristics and activity (i.e., time since TURF 529 
registration or fisher organization implementation, and fraction of TURF area) were retained in 530 
the models, they consistently displayed a negative relationship with OAA catches.   531 
Several aspects of the Chilean TURF system and available data are worth mentioning to 532 
provide additional context and inform interpretation of results. First, this study only considered 533 
fishing coves with at least one functioning TURF (operative or stand by) in 2016. Gelcich et al. 534 
(2017) revealed that about 40% of TURFs are inactive or currently abandoned in Chile. TURFs 535 
that have been abandoned would have increased OAAs, inferring that CPUA values could be lower 536 
in OAAs than actually observed (but possibly higher within TURFs). Second, it is possible that 537 
temporal dynamics and interactions between TURFs and OAAs may have changed over time. Our 538 
analysis began in 2000, however TURF management commenced in the early 1990s and 539 
approximately 18% of the TURFs considered here were initiated prior to 2000. Further analysis 540 
and investigation are needed to determine temporal changes and management interactions during 541 
the first decade of TURF management. Finally, TURFs are a management tool typically used to 542 
achieve sustainable fisheries and resource extraction within their boundaries (Christy 1982, 543 
Aceves-Bueno and Halpern 2018), though it is possible that some TURFs in Chile are maintained 544 
today for non-extractive purposes. For example, Chilean TURFs have been argued to build 545 
leadership and social cohesion among fishers (Rosas et al. 2014, Gelcich et al. 2019) and may offer 546 
benefits for conservation or restoration of benthic habitats (Gelcich et al. 2008a, Blanco et al. 2017, 547 
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Fernández et al. 2017). Non-extractive social or ecological benefits arising from maintained 548 
TURFs in Chile are not considered here but are important areas for future research. 549 
While this analysis was able to discern broad temporal and spatial trends by evaluating 550 
catch and catch rates across 196 fishing coves over two decades, the available data was generally 551 
coarse and requires consideration for potential biases. Recent studies have shown that misreporting 552 
can be a problem in officially reported catches (Oyanedel et al. 2017, Ruano-Chamorro et al. 553 
2017), particularly with respect to locos (official catch is thought to only account for 14-30% of 554 
total loco extraction in Chile). As this research was primarily focused on relative trends and 555 
comparisons among catch and catch rates in OAAs and TURFs, misreporting was considered to 556 
only be problematic if it were non-uniform over space or time or differing between TURFs and 557 
OAAs. We examined the possibility of spatial heterogeneity in catch reporting by examining OLS 558 
model residuals using Studentized Breusch-Pagan tests and found no evidence of heterogeneous 559 
error variances across observations (p>0.05, Appendix 7). Additionally, higher catch rates 560 
observed in TURFs appeared to be robust to catch misreporting. Estimation of OAAs and fishing 561 
effort were based on a number of assumptions regarding fishing behavior. The negative 562 
relationship found between catches of kelp and limpet and OAA size appears counterintuitive: 563 
higher catches outside of TURFs were observed in fishing coves with smaller OAAs. It is possible 564 
that total fishing ground boundaries based on average travel distance (Ruano-Chamorro et al. 565 
2017) and bathymetry were too liberal and thus OAA areas were over-estimated in some instances 566 
(e.g., coastline complexity and wave exposure might limit sailing of small boats and the effective 567 
fishing area). Future research could incorporate fishers’ mobility among proximal fishing coves in 568 
fishing effort estimates, though it would require extensive field studies to determine the 569 
appropriate spatial range of effort. Finally, though CPUE values were found to be lower in OAAs, 570 
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this metric relies on a crude estimate of effort as information on the number of trips or dive 571 
durations was not available. Nevertheless, consistency between CPUE and CPUA measures 572 
(metrics were found to be positively correlated in all areas) suggests that our CPUE values were a 573 
reasonable reflection of catch rates around fishing coves. 574 
Various factors related to local governance could further explain low CPUAs and CPUEs 575 
observed in OAAs as well as the decrease of CPUAs observed over time. Such variables could 576 
include leadership, organizations’ degree of cooperation, government support and governance 577 
network structure. A social-ecological-system framework (Ostrom 2007) was found to be useful 578 
for examining these variables and associated institutional regimes in Mexico and Costa Rica 579 
(Basurto et al. 2013, García Lozano and Heinen 2016). This type of analysis would require 580 
extensive fieldwork, and, therefore, the spatial scale of such analysis would likely be considerably 581 
smaller than that used in this study. Nevertheless, application of such an approach to the Chilean 582 
context represents an important avenue for future work that could enhance our understanding of 583 
the interaction between institutional factors and successful TURFs-based fisheries management. 584 
 Many countries are transitioning marine resource management from common property 585 
systems towards rights-based approaches (e.g., individual transferable quotas, catch shares, or 586 
TURFs), driven by concerns related to sustainability and resource stewardship (Orensanz et al. 587 
2005, Nguyen Thi Quinh et al. 2017). Although the influence of MPAs on surrounding areas and 588 
fisheries sustainability are now well known, enhancing biomass through larval export and adult 589 
spillover (Gell and Roberts 2003, Harrison et al. 2012) or negatively impacting surrounding 590 
unprotected waters through “fishery squeeze” and/or “fishing the line” behavior (Kellner et al. 591 
2007, Caveen et al. 2014, Abbott and Haynie 2012), the impacts of TURFs on surrounding areas 592 
have been poorly documented. This study contributes to a better understanding of management 593 
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spillover between TURFs and OAAs. Whereas the impacts of TURFs appeared weak in this study, 594 
possibly growing over time given the negative relationship with TURF age variables, CPUEs and 595 
CPUAs were significantly lower in OAAs. This finding suggests that OAAs, whose total area is 596 
more than 50 times larger than grounds currently managed as TURFs, may be substantially 597 
degraded and overfished. Several authors have suggested that resources in OAAs might be heavily 598 
exploited and even depleted (González et al. 2006, Orensanz and Parma 2010, Andreu-Cazenave 599 
et al. 2017, de Juan et al. 2017, Oyanedel et al. 2017, Ruano-Chamorro et al. 2017). Interestingly, 600 
our results do not show significant temporal declines in OAA CPUAs, suggesting either shifts in 601 
effort over time or that OAAs were depleted prior to 2000. The research presented here suggests 602 
that TURFs could place additional burden on already heavily fished OAAs. The current fisheries 603 
management regime in Chile includes limited assessment or monitoring of OAAs. It appears 604 
important that more attention be focused on OAAs, and on the system as a whole. By knowing 605 
that TURFs affect fisheries in OAAs, stocks outside managed areas may be more effectively 606 
controlled, provided that existing harvest controls outside of TURFs (i.e., bans, minimum legal 607 
size) are better enforced.  608 
The Chilean TURF network is the largest worldwide, has been extensively studied and 609 
may, therefore, provide useful guidance for countries or regions transitioning toward rights-based 610 
approaches. For example, many Latin America countries have similar spatial management policies 611 
for small-scale fisheries (Mexico, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Galapagos) and also share similar 612 
capacities for enforcement, dependence on a few high-value benthic species, extended OAAs, and 613 
co-management regimes (da Silva 2004, Beitl 2011, Defeo et al. 2016, Garcia Lozano and Heinen 614 
2016). Determining whether or not unintended impacts of TURFs on OAAs, similar to those found 615 
here, exist in these regions is an important area for future research. 616 
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Table 1. Response variable and predictor abbreviations and definitions for the elastic net model. 841 
Variable Definition 
Y Log-transformed, centered catches for species s in OAA areas per fishing cove (mt) 
Age_TURF_mean Average time since the different TURFs implementation per fishing cove (yr) 
Age_TURF_max Maximum time since the oldest TURF implemented per fishing cove (yr) 
Age_Organization_mean Average time since the different fishers' organizations implementation per fishing cove (yr) 
Age_Organization_max Maximum time since the oldest fishers' organization implemented per fishing cove (yr) 
N_TURF Number of TURFs per fishing cove 
N_ORG Number of fishers’ organizations per fishing cove 
Area_OAA Open access areas per fishing cove (km2) 
Area_OAA2 Open access areas per fishing cove (km4) 
Area_Fraction TURF areas divided by total fishing ground (TURF areas + OAA areas) (%) 
Harvesters_All Outside effort, or all licensed divers (or collectors) per fishing cove (divers or collectors) 
Harvesters_per_OAA Outside effort divided by the OAA areas per fishing cove (km-2) 
Harvesters_per_TURF Inside effort divided by the TURF areas per fishing cove (km-2) 
Limpet_per_diver Catches of limpet inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)  
Kelp_per_collector Catches of kelp inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)  
Urchin_per_diver Catches of sea urchin inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /diver)  
Loco_per_diver Catches of loco inside TURF divided by inside effort (mt /collector) 
Coastline_length Length of coast adjacent to the fishing cove (km) 
Landings_port Total landings (algae, fish, mollusk, crustacean, other) of fishing port(s) within 50 km, if any (mt) 
Urban_area Fishing cove is within 50km to one of the ten biggest cities a (1|0) 
a Antofogasta, Arica, Conception, Iquique, Puerto Montt, Punta Arenas, San Antonio, Serena, Valdivia, Valparaiso. 
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Table 2. Average size of TURFs and OAAs with associated average harvesters effort for fishing 843 
coves considered in each region. Standard deviations are indicated in parentheses. Northern 844 
regions consist of regions II, III, IV, V while southern regions include regions VIII, IX, XIV, X 845 
and XI. The number of fishing coves included for each region is given by N.  846 
 TURF  OPEN-ACCESS AREA 
Region Area (km2) Effort (individual)  Area (km2) Effort (individual) 
Northern N=63 3.2 (±3.1) 25.1 (±25.4)  60.8 (±16.5) 33.1 (±34.5) 
Southern  N=114 4.9 (±9.3) 37.0 (±57.1)  90.5 (±29.2) 58.0 (±103.0) 
 847 
 848 
Table 3. 2015 median catch rates (i.e., catch per unit of effort and catch per unit of area) from 849 
inside TURFs and OAAs (i.e., outside TURFs) for each of the four species groups. CPUE is 850 
given in mt/month/harvester. CPUA is given in mt/month/km2. % Diff. is the percentage 851 
difference between median catch rates from the two areas.   852 
  Loco   Limpet  Kelp  Sea urchin 
  Inside  Inside Outside % Diff.  Inside Outside % Diff.  Inside Outside % Diff. 
CPUE 0.13  0.04 0.01 75.00  0.66 0.16 75.75  0.07 0.01 85.71 
CPUA 1.09  0.36 0.001 99.72  12.85 0.39 96.96  0.49 0.01 97.96 
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Table 4. Results of the linear mixed effect models estimating log-transformed CPUAs for loco, 854 
limpet, kelp, and sea urchin inside TURFs. Model 2 only considers a subsample of fishing coves 855 
that have a constant number of TURF(s) for at least ten years. Significance is denoted by: 856 
p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. Coefficients were transformed in the text 857 
into percent changes in CPUA for a given change in the predictor variable using the following 858 
formula: %∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽∆𝑥𝑥 − 1�. Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination are 859 
respectively given by r2m and r
2
c. Number of observations and number of fishing coves included 860 
for each model are respectively given by n and N.  861 
  
 
Loco  Limpet Kelp Sea urchin 
Model Predictor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
1 Intercept 1.19 1.23E-19 *** 0.37 0.01 * 3.63 5.32E-18 *** 0.82 0.01 * 
 
Year -0.08 3.46E-25 *** -0.04 2.80E-4 *** -0.02 0.45 -0.05 0.03 * 
 
NTURF -0.11 1.19E-4 *** -0.29 3.07E-10 *** -0.34 4.31E-7 *** -0.22 4.10E-3 
** 
 
r2m 0.10 
 
0.22 
 
0.25 
 
0.12 
 
 
r2c 0.68 
 
0.64 
 
0.65 
 
0.72 
 
 
n 1,077 
 
473 
 
203 
 
220 
 
 
N 138 
 
78 
 
49 
 
50 
 
2 Intercept 178.18 2.47E-13 *** 21.22 0.49 138.30 0.16 53.13 0.53 
 
Year -0.09 2.71E-13 *** -0.01 0.49 -0.07 0.17 -0.03 0.53 
 
r2m 0.08 
 
1.38E-3 
 
0.03 
 
2.81E-3 
 
 
r2c 0.59 
 
0.63 
 
0.43 
 
0.67 
 
 
n 372 
 
160 
 
52 
 
65 
 
 
N 49 
 
31 
 
13 
 
16 
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Table 5. Results of the linear mixed effect models estimating log-transformed CPUAs for limpet, 863 
kelp, and sea urchin outside TURFs (OAAs). There is no result for loco as it is not exploited in 864 
OAAs. Model 2 only considers a subsample of fishing coves that have a constant number of 865 
TURF(s) for at least ten years. Significance is denoted by: p<0.001=‘***’, p<0.01=‘**’, 866 
p<0.05=‘*’, p<0.1=‘.’. Coefficients were transformed in the text into percent changes in CPUA 867 
for a given change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∙868 
�𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽∆𝑥𝑥 − 1�. Marginal and conditional coefficients of determination are respectively given by r2m 869 
and r2c. Number of observations and number of fishing coves included for each model are 870 
respectively given by n and N. 871 
  
Limpet Kelp Sea urchin 
Model Predictor Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
1 Intercept -5.87 1.40E-16 *** -2.63 8.03E-19 *** -5.23 2.48E-16 *** 
 
Year -0.05 4.57E-9 *** 0.03 0.03* -8.01E-3 0.41 
 
NTURF 0.02 0.61 -0.03 0.66 6.87E-3 0.85 
 
r2m 0.01 
 
2.21E-3 
 
2.33E-4 
 
 
r2c 0.60 
 
0.81 
 
0.75 
 
 
n 1,433 
 
933 
 
1,155 
 
 
N 179 
 
148 
 
161 
 
2 Intercept 44.93 0.05* 4.49 0.92 -23.49 0.45 
 
Year -0.03 0.02* -3.01E-3 0.89 8.82E-3 0.57 
 
r2m 4.84E-3 
 
2.59E-5 
 
3.29E-4 
 
 
r2c 0.55 
 
0.65 
 
0.66 
 
 
n 534 
 
336 
 
394 
 
 
N 54 
 
49 
 
52 
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Table 6. Change in OLS variance explained with specific variables: OLS_all includes all initial 873 
predictors, OLS_TURF includes only TURF related predictors, OLS_Geo includes only 874 
geospatial context predictors and OLS_elastic includes only predictors selected by the elastic net 875 
model. 876 
   
OLS_all OLS_TURF OLS_Geo  OLS_elastic 
Limpet Adj.r2 0.31 0.12 0.25 0.31 
 r2 0.54 0.28 0.37 0.36 
Kelp  Adj.r2 0.55 0.26 0.42 0.55 
 r2 0.71 0.40 0.52 0.65 
Sea Urchin Adj.r2 0.34 0.33 0.40 0.51 
 r2 0.70 0.52 0.55 0.58 
  877 
42 
 
Table 7. Results of the elastic net regression model estimating catches for limpet, sea urchin and 878 
kelp outside the TURFs according to λmin, the value that minimizes the cross-validation MSE 879 
which yields the most accurate model. Only predictors that were selected for at least 40% of the 880 
10,000 bootstraps are shown in this table and they are ranked according to their importance (i.e., 881 
higher percentage of inclusion in the model). Elastic net mean coefficients were returned on the 882 
original scale here but they were transformed in the text into percent changes in catch for a given 883 
change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆𝑦𝑦 = 100 ∙ �𝑦𝑦𝛽𝛽∆𝑥𝑥 − 1�. OLS 884 
normalized coefficients are unitless. Number of observations for each model is given with n.  885 
  Predictor % inclusion Sign 
Elastic net 
coefficient 
OLS normalized 
coefficient 
Limpet  Divers_All a 100 + 0.02 0.99 
n=54 Urban_Area 83.69 - 0.40 0.50 
 Area_OAA2 60.35 - 8.15E-5 0.58 
 Area_fraction 41.86 - 0.02 0.72 
Kelp  Collectors_All a 100 + 2.31E-3 0.93 
n=54 Urban_Area 99.73 - 1.28 0.63 
 Loco_per_diver 91.11 + 0.35 0.47 
 Area_OAA 90.48 - 0.01 0.51 
 Area_OAA2 84.77 - 1.03E-4 2.10E-3 
 Age_TURF_max 84.40 - 0.08 0.16 
 Kelp_per_collector 78 + 0.01 0.29 
 Age_TURF 73.03 - 0.05 0.33 
 Age_Organization_max 59.74 - 0.07 0.16 
 Area_fraction 47.36 - 7.53E-3 0.18 
 N_ORG 41.80 - 0.05 0.48 
Sea Divers_All a 100 + 0.01 1.37 
Urchin Coastline_length 99.67 + 0.01 1.86 
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n=36 Limpet_per_diver 62.45 - 4.84 b 0.48 
 Age_TURF_max 47.34 - 0.04 0.56 
 Age_TURF 46.96 - 0.03 0.02 
 886 
a The shrinkage penalty was set to 0 for the variable Divers_All and Collectors_All (instead of 1 887 
for other variables), forcing this variable to be included in the model.  888 
b This large effect is driven by two outliers. Removing this predictor did not change qualitatively 889 
the results. 890 
 891 
Figures  892 
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  893 
Figure 1. Administrative regions of Chile. Fishing coves included in the comparison of 2015 catch 894 
rates and mixed effect models are represented with the black dots. The elastic net regressions only 895 
consider fishing coves within the northern regions II, III, IV, V and within the southern regions 896 
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VIII, IX, XIV, X and XI (dotted rectangles). The 20 m isobaths layer was only available from 897 
central Chile (dashed rectangle from 27° to 36°).  898 
  899 
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 900 
Figure 2. Boxplots of  2015 CPUEs (A, B, C, D) and CPUAs (E, F, G, H) for the four species loco 901 
(A,E) keyhole limpet (B, F), kelp (C, G), and red sea urchin (D, H) by fishing coves, differentiated 902 
by catch origin inside or outside TURFs (i.e. OAA). Loco’s extraction is banned in OAAs.  903 
 904 
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 905 
Figure 3. Observed catch per unit of area (mt/ month/ km2) values for the four species loco (A), 906 
keyhole limpet (B), kelp (C), and red sea urchin (D) used in the mixed effect models. Light grey 907 
dots are CPUAs from inside TURFs, dark grey dots are CPUAs from OAAs. Predicted value and 908 
standard errors for a given year is given by the straight line and shaded area. 909 
Appendices
TURF status Definition Count
Designated 
with a public 
decree in force
Assigned to a fisher 
organization
Operative and designated TURFs with a baseline 
study, an approved management plan, a use 
agreement and a TAC in place.
391
In stand-by TURF for which monitoring has not 
been conducted by the due date. However, there 
was a quota assigned in the last 4 years.
221
Rejected TURFs without an assigned fishing association 
(include a change in organizations and rejected 
application).
4
Available for 
assignment 
Designated TURFs that are not assigned to a fishing 
organization yet or the organization has not 
complied with necessary initial baseline studies.
164
Disaffected TURFs that returned to an open access regime 
because fishers organizations have not met the 
requirements (reports, management plans). 
1
In evaluation TURFs without a public decree in force, in process 
of consultation before the establishment of the 
availability decree.
297
Rejected TURFs that have followed the consultation process 
but have been rejected for various reasons 
(economic or environmental).
234
A1. TURFs status in Chile in 2017.
A2. A) Total fishing grounds (comprising TURFs and OAAs) were created per fishing cove based
on sailing time and bathymetry. The offshore width of these polygons was based on a typical
maximum harvest depth of 20 m (dashed line) extrapolated for the whole coast from a 100 m
isobaths layer (dotted line, source GEBCO). Estimates of OAA areas were calculated as fishing
ground areas minus assigned TURFs areas (grey striped area). B) Fishing ground area based on
bathymetry 20 m in function of fishing ground area based on bathymetry 100 m according to the
relationship y = x + ? ? + 0 (red line) that fits better than the relationship y = x + 0 (green line).
Bathymetry 20 m
Bathymetry 100 m 17 km radius 
fishing ground
OAA
Fishing cove
TURF
A) B)
A3. Log catches (mt) per fishing coves as a function of latitude for each group of species: loco (A),
keyhole limpet (B), kelp (C), and red sea urchin (D) and differentiated by their origin, i.e., catches
inside TURFs (white dots) or from the OAA (black dots). Dashed lines represent the delimitations of
the 15 administrative regions of Chile. Black boxes represent regional grouping of important regions
for each fishery.
A) B) C) D)
Given a linear regression model with p predictors, the elastic net solves this regularization problem:
Where
In (1), yi,s is the response, here catches of species s in the open access area at fishing cove i; Ns is the
number of fishing coves with catches from OAAs for species s; xi,s is explanatory data, a vector of p
values for species s at fishing cove i; βp,s is the for species s; λ is a positive regularization parameter;
and α is the elastic net penalty. The coefficient for each p predictor elastic net minimizes the sum of
squared differences between observed and predicted values subject to a constraint, Pα(β), that penalizes
for model complexity as well as for large absolute values of normalized coefficients (Equations 1, 2).
The form of the penalty is controlled by the parameter α. With α=0, coefficients of correlated predictors
shrink towards each other. With α=1, the most influential correlated predictor is selected while others
are discarded. The elastic net sets α to 0.5, which leads to selection of groups of predictors that
independently or jointly explain variance (Equation 2, Zou and Hastie 2005, Friedman et al. 2010).
Separate penalty factors can be applied to each coefficient to allow different shrinkage. In our case, the
penalty factors were considered equal for all variables except for the variable Harvesters_all
(representing the total number of harvesters), for which the penalty was set to 0 so that this variable was
always included in the model. The optimal value of the regularization parameter λ, which controlled the
strength of the penalty, was selected using a 10-fold cross-validation method. Two different values of λ
were considered: the value that minimized the cross-validation mean squared error (MSE) (λmin), and
the maximum value within one standard error of the λmin (λ1SE). The more restrictive regularization with
λ1SE (i.e., the larger penalty that leads to models with smaller or fewer parameter values) yields a
simpler model while maintaining a level of accuracy found to be close to that obtained when using λmin
(Hastie et al. 2009). The cross-validation process, which randomly selects training data and returns new
values for λ1SE and λmin at each iteration, was repeated 1,000 times and the final model used average
values for λ1SE and λmin.
A4. Elastic net model development
𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼�𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 ,𝑠𝑠� = (1−𝛼𝛼)2 �𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 ,𝑠𝑠�22 + 𝛼𝛼�𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 ,𝑠𝑠�1 = ∑ �(1−𝛼𝛼)2 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗2 + 𝛼𝛼�𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗=1 . (2) 
  
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝛽𝛽0,𝛽𝛽  � 12𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠  ∑ �𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 ,𝑠𝑠 − 𝛽𝛽0,𝑠𝑠 − 𝑥𝑥𝑚𝑚 ,𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑇 𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 ,𝑠𝑠�2 +𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚=1 λ𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼(𝛽𝛽𝑝𝑝 ,𝑠𝑠)�, (1) 
  
Non-null predictor % inclusion Sign Elastic net coefficient
OLS normalized 
coefficient
Limpet Divers_All a 100 + 0.021 0.661
Urban_Area 41.43 - 0.100 0.644
Kelp Collectors_All a 100 + 0.002 0.448
Urban_Area 99.49 - 0.976 0.860
Area_OAA 86.25 - 0.006 0.435
Area_OAA2 85.89 - 7.68E-5 0.025
Age_TURF_mean 67.20 - 0.031 0.181
Age_TURF_max 51.78 - 0.025 0.324
Sea Divers_All a 100 + 0.011 1.231
Urchin Coastline_length 98.98 + 0.006 2.087
a The shrinkage penalty was set to 0 for the variable Divers_All and Collectors_All (instead of 1 
for other variables), forcing this variable to be included in the model. 
Results of the elastic net regression model estimating catches for limpet, sea urchin and kelp
outside the TURFs according to λ1SE, the maximum value within one standard error of the λmin
which yields the most restrictive model. Only predictors that were selected for at least 40% of the
10,000 bootstraps are shown in this table and they are ranked according to their importance (i.e.,
higher percentage of inclusion in the model). Elastic net mean coefficients were returned on the
original scale here but were transformed in the text into percent changes in catch for a given
change in the predictor variable using the following formula: %∆? ? = 100 � ? ???∆?? −1 . OLS
normalized coefficients are unitless.
A5. Elastic net model results with λ1SE
For the most restrictive models using the regularization parameter λ1SE, most of the predictors
retained to explain catch in OAAs were related to the geospatial context. The predictor Urban_Area
was selected in 41.30% of the 10,000 bootstraps when modeling limpet catches and 99.49% of the
bootstraps when modeling kelp extraction, being the strongest identified driver of catch outside of
TURFs in both cases. This predictor exhibited a negative relationship with catches outside TURFs
for both species groups, with lower catches in OAAs for limpet (10% decrease) and kelp (165%
decrease) close to urban areas.
No other predictors were selected for limpet, whereas several predictors related to OAA and
time since TURF implementation were selected for kelp. Lower catches of kelp outside of TURFs
were counterintuitively associated with fishing coves that had larger OAA areas (6% decrease in
catch for every additional 10 km2 of OAA area). Area_OAA and Area_OAA2 were selected in at least
80% of bootstraps and were considered to be highly important drivers for kelp catch outside of
TURFs. Moderately lower catches of kelp outside of TURFs (3% decrease) were associated with
fishing coves that had older TURFs. The related variables Age_TURF_mean and Age_TURF_max
were included in 67.2% and 51.78% of the bootstraps, respectively.
Higher catches of sea urchin in OAAs were associated with fishing coves that have longer
coastline lengths (6% increase in catch for every additional 10 km of coastline). This predictor was
the only additional factor selected for explaining sea urchin catches in OAAs (selected in 98.98% of
cases).
A5. Elastic net model results with λ1SE
A6. A) Number of active licensed harvesters over time according to the different categories with the 
solid line representing number of divers for loco, limpet and sea urchin exploitation and the dotted 
line representing the number of collectors mainly for kelp extraction. The different categories are not 
mutually exclusive. Licensed harvesters can exploit the open-access area but are not necessarily 
granted TURF access. B) Total number of licensed harvesters per regions and per year. 
A) B)
A7. Test of heteroscedasticity using the Studentized Breusch-Pagan test from the OLS output 
considering all initial predictors. P-values < 0.05 indicate heteroscedasticity of the OLS 
residuals.
Species All predictors
Limpet p=0.35
Kelp p=0.83
Sea urchin p=0.97
